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SALIENCY, ANCHORS & FRAMES:
A MULTICOMPONENT DAMAGES
EXPERIMENT
Bernard Chao and Roderick O’Dorisio
Modern technology products contain thousands, sometimes hundreds
of thousands, of different features. Nonetheless, when electronics
manufacturers are sued for patent infringement, these suits typically
accuse only one feature, or in more complex suits, a handful of
features, of actual patent infringement. But damages verdicts often do
not reflect the relatively small contribution an individual patent makes
to an infringing product. One study observed that verdicts in these
types of cases average 9.98% of the price of the entire product. While
both courts and commentators have blamed the law of patent damages,
the role cognitive biases play in these outsized damages awards has
been understudied. Relying on decision-making concepts from other
contexts, we hypothesize that two biases, namely, a saliency bias and
anchoring, may be at work in a patent trial. Since the infringing
feature is the most salient feature in a patent trial (i.e. the focus of the
trial), jurors may tend to overvalue that feature. Moreover, a
patentee’s irrationally high damages demand may “anchor” the juries
to that number.
We conducted an online 3x3x2 between-subjects experiment to test
whether these biases exist and if so, whether particular debiasing
techniques may reduce these biases. In eighteen different scenarios,
mock jurors were asked to assess damages for different smartphone
features. The three manipulations involved: 1) rotating three features
so that they were either the feature underlying the plaintiffs’ claim (the
“feature-in-suit”) or one of the other features defendant identified as
contributing to the smartphone’s overall value; 2) changing the jury
verdict form so that mock jurors had to evaluate both the feature-insuit and other features together; and 3) having the defendant explicitly
call out the plaintiff for anchoring the jury in an irrationally high
number.
The results suggest that some combination of the saliency bias and
anchoring were at play when juries assessed damages for all three
tested features. However, for the storage feature the results were only
signficant for the feature’s relative rank, but not its dollar valuation.
That may be because mock juors are familir with the cost of the
increased storage. Modifying the jury verdict form reduced, but did not
eliminate, the primary effect of the saliency bias, while the defendant’s
tactic of exposing the plaintiffs’ anchor did not significantly reduce
1
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damages. In addition, qualitative comments suggested that some mock
jurors resisted the jury instructions designed to compensate plaintiffs
for the missing feature and instead assessed damages to punish the
defendant.
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Introduction
Modern technology products contain thousands, sometimes hundreds of
thousands, of different features. Nonetheless, when electronics manufactur-
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ers are sued for patent infringement, these suits typically accuse only one
feature, or in more complex suits, a handful of features, of actual patent infringement. But damages verdicts often do not reflect the relatively small
contribution an individual patent makes to an infringing product. One study
observed that verdicts in these types of cases average 9.98% of the price of
the entire product. While both the courts and commentators have blamed the
law of patent damages, the role cognitive biases may play in these outsized
damages awards has been understudied. Relying on decision-making concepts from other contexts, we hypothesize that two biases, namely, a saliency bias and anchoring, may be at work in a patent trial. Since the infringing
feature is the most salient feature in a patent trial (i.e. the focus of the trial),
jurors may tend to overvalue that feature. Moreover, a patentee’s irrationally
high damages demand may “anchor” the juries to that number.
We conducted an online 3x3x2 between-subjects experiment to test
whether these biases exist and if so, whether particular debiasing techniques
may reduce these biases. In eighteen different scenarios, mock jurors were
asked to assess damages for different smartphone features. The three manipulations involved: 1) rotating three features so that they were either the
feature-in-suit underlying the plaintiffs’ claim or one of the other features
the defendant identified as contributing to the smartphone’s overall value; 2)
changing the jury verdict form so that mock jurors had to evaluate both the
feature-in-suit and other features together; and 3) having the defendant explicitly call out the plaintiff for anchoring the jury in an irrationally high
number.
The results suggest that some combination of the saliency bias and anchoring were at play when juries assessed damages for all three tested features. However, for the storage feature the results were only significant for
the feature’s relative rank, not its dollar valuation. That may be because the
value of increased storage was familiar to mock jurors while the value of the
other two features was not. Modifying the jury verdict form reduced, but did
not eliminate, the primary effect of the saliency bias, while the defendant’s
tactic of exposing the plaintiffs’ anchor did not significantly reduce damages. In addition, qualitative comments suggested that some mock jurors resisted the jury instructions designed to compensate plaintiffs for the missing
feature and instead assessed damages to punish the defendant.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the problem of large
damages in multicomponent patent lawsuits. It explains how commentators
have characterized the problem and how courts have sought to address the
issue. In both cases, these experts have focused on legal fixes that do not
take into account cognitive biases. By taking concepts from various decision-making studies, Part II describes the saliency bias and anchoring generally and then explains how they may operate in patent trials to inflate
damages awards. Part II then explores two potential de-biasing techniques.
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Part III describes the experiment, which was based on a product mislabeling lawsuit. The defendant mistakenly advertised a single feature that
was not present in the smartphone that the plaintiffs purchased. Liability
was conceded, and mock jurors only had to decide damages. Although our
primary goal was to evaluate how juries determine patent damages, we
based our experiment on a products misrepresentation case. The simpler legal requirements in a misrepresentation claim allowed us to rotate different
smartphone features between the plaintiffs’ case and the defendant’s case
more easily. The plaintiff would describe the feature-in-suit and request a
high damages award. In response, the defendant would minimize the value
of the feature-in-suit and would describe several other smartphone features
to show that the feature-in-suit only contributed to a small part of the overall
value of the smartphone. After mock jurors assessed damages, they were
asked to also value the other features that the defendant described. By comparing the value of a feature when it was in the plaintiffs’ case with the value of the same feature when it was in the defendant’s case, we were able to
determine whether saliency and anchoring were operating to increase damage awards. In our second manipulation, we changed the jury verdict form
to require mock jurors to assess the value of the feature-in-suit together with
other features to determine whether we can take advantage of other heuristics (in this case, a framing effect) to reduce the primary effect of the saliency bias (if any). Finally, in our third manipulation, we tested another debiasing technique. This time the defendant explicitly accuses the plaintiff of
asking for irrationally high damages to take advantage of anchoring effects.
The theory is that if the mock jurors understand that they may be manipulated, they will be less susceptible to that manipulation.
Part IV then describes our results. Our primary saliency-bias hypothesis
was confirmed for two tested features (camera resolution and enhanced security). The values of these features were significantly more valuable when
they were part of the plaintiffs’ case than when they were part of the defendant’s case. However, the findings with respect to a third feature (more
storage) were more difficult to interpret. Mock jurors ranked the value of
this feature higher when it was part of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, but their monetary valuation did not increase as well. That may be because the value of increased storage was familiar to mock jurors while the value of the other two
features was not. Additionally, we had mixed results for our debiasing manipulations. Modifying the jury verdict form reduced damages by less than
ten percent, while the defendant’s tactic of calling out the anchor did not
have any significant effect. Finally, Part IV also examines many of the
comments mock jurors made after they rendered their decisions. Interestingly, many juries did not appear to follow the jury instructions. Specifically,
some jurors appeared to focus on the defendant’s culpability and sought to
punish the defendant. In Part V, we discuss the limitations of our study. In
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Part VI, we explore what our findings mean for real world litigations and
suggest additional areas for follow-on research.

I. Outsized Damage Awards
Many technology products today are literally covered by hundreds of
1
thousands of different patents. For example, a smartphone likely has patents on the user interface, the microprocessors, memory chips, communication protocols and even the software that runs on one device. But patent
lawsuits typically only involve one of these patents. In a few larger, more
complex cases, the plaintiff asserts a few patents. Thus, even if only the
most valuable patents make it to trial, we would expect damages awards to
be only a relatively small percentage of the overall sales prices of these multicomponent products. But that is not the case. In 2007, Lemley and Shapiro
found that reasonable royalty awards for a single component that was part of
2
more complex multicomponent products averaged 9.98%. This number
seems particularly high given that the average royalty rate across all types of
3
patents was 13.1% and for integrated product claims, 14.7%. Several more
recent high profile cases suggest that the same problems continue to be a
4
problem today.
These high damages rates suggest that patent law has been overcom5
pensating patentees in these types of technology cases. Existing legal doc6
trine has taken the blame. The current test for determining reasonable roy-

1.
In 2011, RPX estimated that 250,000 patents apply to the smartphone. RPX Corp.,
Registration Statement 59 (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2011) (“Based on our research, we believe
there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today’s smartphones. . .”). Of course,
smartphones have become even more complicated since 2011.
2.
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2032 tbl.1 (2007).
3.
Id. at 2034. One would expect that the component royalty would be substantially
smaller than rates found in other fields, but the royalties for all inventions was 13.1% and for
integrated product claims 14.7%. See id.
4.
See, e.g., Wisconsin Alumni Research Found. v. Apple Inc., No. 14-CV-062WMC, 2015 WL 6755209 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 19, 2015) (jury awarded over $234 million in
damages for a patent involving microprocessors in Apple’s iPhones); Carnegie Mellon Univ.
v. Marvell Tech. Grp., No. 09-290, 2012 WL 6686094 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 2012) (verdict form
awarding $1.17 billion); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec.’s Inc., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012
WL 10208466 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (verdict form awarding $1.049 billion); Uniloc
U.S.A. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-440, 2009 WL 960940 (D. R.I. Apr. 8, 2009) (verdict
form awarding approx. $582 million); Lucent Tech. Inc. v. Gateway Inc., No. 02-CV-2060 B
(CAB), 2007 WL 892887 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007) (verdict form awarding approx. $1.5 billion).
5.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2034 (“[W]e should expect to see a more significant reduction in the royalty rate if the system were working as intended.”).
6.
Id. (“[I]t is reasonable to conclude that the legal doctrines designed to make the
reasonable royalty track the actual value of the patented contribution are not working, at least
not fully.”).
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alties consists of weighing a mind-boggling fifteen Georgia Pacific factors.
While two Georgia-Pacific factors reflect the so-called “apportionment”
principles—the royalty should only reflect the patent’s relative contribution
to the overall infringing product—it is unclear how much weight juries give
8
these two factors. Several commentators have argued that the Georgia Pacific test gives juries too much discretion and leads to damages awards that
9
overvalue the patent at issue. To aggravate the problem, the number and
complexity of the factors hinders judges from effectively policing jury ver10
dicts. In response to complaints from technology companies, Congress
11
worked on draft legislation to curb damages awards from 2007 to 2010.
Yet, at the same time, an unusually activist Federal Circuit argued that legislation was unnecessary and suggested that it could handle any problems in
12
patent damages law.
Although Congress eventually amended the patent laws in 2011, damages reform was not part of that legislation, most likely because of a lack of
13
industry consensus. But the Federal Circuit followed through on its promises by issuing several decisions rejecting different types of damages evidence and vacating large damages awards. In 2009, the Federal Circuit
threw out a $358 million award against Microsoft in Lucent Technologies v.

7.
Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified sub nom. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d
Cir. 1971). Some courts are finally starting to give jury instructions that are no longer based
on the Georgia Pacific factors. See e.g. Northern District of California Model Patent Jury Instruction 5.7 (updated Oct. 2019).
8.
Factor 9 discusses the “advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices” and factor 13 the “portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks,
or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.” Id.
9.
Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1666 (2010) (“there is a growing body
of evidence that Georgia-Pacific has resulted in the systematic overcompensation of patent
owners in certain industries.”); Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U.
CIN. L. REV. 97, 108 (2011) (suggesting that juries must not be applying apportionment principles properly).
10.
Seaman, supra note 9, at 1707 2010, BYU L. Rev at 1707 (“the amorphous nature
of the Georgia-Pacific test makes it difficult for a jury’s reasonable royalty award to be adequately reviewed during post-trial motions or on appeal”); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
627, 632-33 (2010) (arguing that the complexity of the current fifteen factor test for determining reasonably royalties allows judges to “simply give up and defer to whatever the jury
awards”).
11.
Jonas Anderson, Congress as Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63
AM. U. L. REV. 961, 990-99 (2014) (describing legislative efforts from 2007-2010 to reform
patent law including provision regarding damages).
12.
Id. at 995 (describing how Chief Judge Michel stated that the Federal Circuit was
open to altering it damages case law and invited stakeholders to raise the issues on appeal).
13.
In 2011, the American Invents Act was passed, but the proposed damages reforms
found in earlier drafts were not included in the final version of the legislation. Id. at 1004.
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14

Gateway. The infringing feature was the so-called “date picker” feature,
15
which allowed users to select dates without using a keyboard. The Federal
Circuit noted that the date picker was “but a tiny feature of one part of a
16
much larger software program [Outlook].” The decision identified several
problems in the way damages were calculated. One notable flaw was how
Lucent’s expert effectively used the value of the sale of computers loaded
with the software rather than the patented portions of the software to calcu17
late damages. That allowed Lucent to frame their damages request as a
comparatively small percentage of the overall sales base. Since sales of the
three infringing software products were approximately $8 billion, the 8%
18
that Lucent sought was still $561.9 million. The Federal Circuit rejected
19
Lucent’s approach and vacated the damages award. More recent decisions
have carried forth this analysis and now insist that royalties adequately ap20
portion damages based on the relative contribution the patent makes. One
way the Federal Circuit has sought to prevent patentees from capturing the
value of the larger product is to insist that royalties be based on the “small21
est salable unit.” Patentees can only base sales on a larger more complex
product if the patented feature provides the basis for customers’ demand for
the larger product.
Two years after Lucent Technologies, the Federal Circuit categorically
rejected another approach blamed for disproportionately high damages
awards: the 25% rule of thumb. In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft, the patent
covered a mechanism for combating casual copying by creating a unique
registration number used to verify that a particular copy of a program was
22
authorized. A jury found that the Product Activation feature in Microsoft’s
14.
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
15.
Id. at 1317. The court described the patent as “generally directed to a method of
entering information into fields on a computer screen without using a keyboard.” Id. at 1308.
16.
Id. at 1332.
17.
Id. at 1338-39.
18.
Id. at 1323.
19.
Id. at 1334.
20.
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Virnetx,
Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he district court should
have exercised its gatekeeping authority to ensure that only theories comporting with settled
principles of appointment were allowed to reach the jury.”).
21.
See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“The smallest salable unit principle directs that ‘in any case involving multicomponent products, patentees may not calculate damages based on sales of the entire product, as opposed to the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, without showing that the demand
for the entire product is attributable to the patented feature.’” (citation omitted)); Versata
Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[A] patentee may
assess damages based on the entire market value of the accused product only where the patented feature creates the basis for customer demand or substantially creates the value of the
component parts.” (quoting SnyQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2013))).
22.
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Word XP, Word 2003, and Windows XP infringed the patent. Relying in
large part on the 25% rule, Uniloc’s expert testified that Uniloc should be
24
awarded $564,946,803. Under that rule, “licensees pay a royalty rate
equivalent to 25 per cent [sic] of its expected profits for the product that in25
corporates the IP at issue.” While the jury did not give Uniloc all that it requested, it did award $388 million. The Federal Circuit rejected the rule of
thumb saying that it was “a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a
26
baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.”
Legal rules like requiring apportionment, basing royalties on the smallest saleable unit, and rejecting the 25% rule of thumb undoubtedly placed
downward pressure on damages in multicomponent cases, but they did not
solve the entire problem. Although patent trials are quite rare, there are still
unusually high damages awards in multicomponent cases. Apple’s clash
with Samsung is one prominent example. The jury initially awarded Apple
$1.05 billion for Samsung infringing three utility patents and two design pa27
tents. However, these patents only covered a small portion of the technolo28
gy found in Samsung’s infringing smartphone and tablets. Through numerous appeals, Samsung has successfully whittled away at the $1 billion
29
award.

23.
Id. at 1300-01.
24.
Id. at 1311.
25.
Id. at 1312(quoting Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz, and Carla Mulhern, Use Of
The 25 Per Cent Rule in Valuing IP, 37 LES NOUVELLES 123, 123 (2002).
26.
Id. at 1315.
27.
Amended Verdict Form at 15, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Inc., No. 11-CV01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012), ECF No. 1931 (awarding $1.049 billion).
28.
The three utility patents asserted comprised of the ‘381 patent, the ‘915 patent, and
the ‘163 patent. The ‘381 patent is directed to “a software feature known as the ‘bounce-back’
feature,” which is “activated when the user is scrolling through a document displayed on the
device. If the user attempts to scroll past the end of the document, an area beyond the edge of
the document is displayed to indicate that the user has reached the document’s end.” Apple
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The ‘915 patent is directed
to the “pinch-to-zoom” gesture, and the ‘163 patent is directed to the “double-tap-to-zoom”
functionality. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The
four design patents asserted are the ‘677 design patent, the ‘087 design patent, the ‘305 design
patent, and the ‘889 patent. The ‘087 and the ‘677 design patents “are directed to designs that
Apple contends are generally embodied in the iPhone . . . . Both patents claim a minimalist
design for a rectangular smartphone consisting of a large rectangular display occupying most
of the phone’s front face.” 678 F.3d at 1317. The ‘305 design patent “claims the ornamental
design of the iPhone’s graphical user interface, including the arrangement of rows of square
icons with rounded corners.” 735 F.3d at 1357. The ‘889 design patent is “directed to the design of a tablet computer” and “depicts a rectangular tablet with a polished reflective surface
extending to the edge of the front side of the device.” 678 F.3d at 1318.
29.
See, Jacob Kastrenakes, Apple and Samsung Settle Seven-Year-Long Patent Fight
Over Copying the iPhone, THE VERGE (Jun. 27, 2018, 2:59 PM) (“Most recently, the verdict
had been whittled down to $539 million for Apple.”); see also Pamela Samuelson & Mark
Gergen, The Disgorgement Remedy of Design Patent Law, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 16-17 n.109), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_
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But while courts throw out some disproportionately high damages
awards, these decisions do nothing to prevent subsequent juries from issuing
30
similar awards in the future. The problem is one of timing. Courts typically
impose limits on damages after the jury issues its verdict. Trial courts can
only grant a JMOL (judgment as a matter of law) discarding a damages verdict or remitter after the jury has rendered its verdict. Of course, any appeal
to the Federal Circuit takes place even later. But these ex post solutions are
inefficient. Both the parties and the trial court expend significant time and
resources at trial. If possible, any intervention should help juries arrive at a
proper damages verdict in the first instance.
The large number of Georgia Pacific factors complicate this task because it is often easy to find an argument for increased royalties under one
of the test’s fifteen factors, and it is easy for experts to latch on to the more
subjective factors of the test and obfuscate the jury. We hypothesize that as
long as attorneys can continue to make colorable arguments supporting an
extremely high damages request, that request (i.e. the anchor) will have an
unduly high impact on the ultimate verdict. That is because jurors (like everyone) are subject to a wide variety of cognitive biases. One or more of
these biases may be at work when juries issue disproportionate damages
awards in multicomponent patent cases. We describe our hypotheses in
greater detail below.

II. The Psychology of Patent Damages
Beginning with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, social scientists
have shown that people make irrational decisions in a wide variety of con31
texts. That is because they take mental shortcuts called heuristics. Count32
less works have now identified a variety of forms of cognitive biases. We

ID3353536_code1664945.pdf?abstractid=3353536&mirid=1 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019)
(“The $1.05 billion jury award in 2012 included damages for trade dress dilution and utility
patent infringement as well as for design patent infringement. In post-verdict proceedings, the
trial court adjusted the design patent award to $399 million. The 2017 jury awarded Apple
$533.3 million for the design patent infringements, plus about $5 million as a reasonable royalty for utility patent infringement.”).
30.
Examples of damages rulings that effectively eliminate a jury decision abound. See
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding for potential new trial); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016) (remanded to
determine damages again); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1235-36 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (vacating jury’s damages award and remanding for further proceedings).
31.
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974).
32.
See e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds.,
2005); Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
715 (1981).
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suggest that two such biases may be at work as juries decide patent damages
33
for multicomponent products.

A. Potential Biases
1. Saliency Bias
A form of saliency bias may cause juries to overvalue an infringing fea34
ture. Saliency bias refers to the fact that individuals are more likely to focus on items or information that are more prominent (and salient) and ignore
35
items and information that are less visible. For example, individuals that
have been recently exposed to news about violent crime tend to overestimate the likelihood of a violent crime occurring in that individual’s neigh36
borhood. Psychologists have theorized that saliency bias stems from people’s limited ability to process information. Since they cannot consider all
the relevant facts, they naturally focus on particularly salient information.
That information then tends to exert undue influence on the individual’s decision-making.
In patent infringement cases involving multicomponent electronic
products (e.g. a smartphone or a television), the majority of the trial time
naturally focuses on the accused infringing feature. This is true even though
a multicomponent product is likely to have thousands, if not hundreds of
37
thousands, of other features. Thus, information about the accused feature is

33.
Thomas Cotter has discussed how heuristics may affect patent damages and argued
that courts should be aware of how these heuristics can affect both the decisions of judges and
juries. Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 164
(2018).
34.
See Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top
of the Head Phenomena, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249, 254
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 11th ed. 1978).
35.
Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON
REG. 253, 254 (2011) (“In making decisions, individuals rely on heuristics or cognitive biases.
One of these is salience, which refers to visibility or prominence. Individuals systematically
focus on items or information that is prominent or salient and ignore information or items that
are less visible.”).
36.
Daneil Romer et al., Television News and the Cultivation of Fear of Crime, J. OF
COMM. 88, 91, 99 (2003) (In a national sample collected in 1997, perceived risk of crime was
related to local television news exposure.); see also Allen E. Liska & William. Baccaglini,
Feeling Safe by Comparison: Crime in the Sewspapers, 37 SOC. PROBS. 360, 366 (1990)
(homicide stories in particular show the strongest relationship to public fear in the local
news); Bryan H. Reber & Yuhmin Chang, Assessing Cultivation Theory and Public Health
Model of Crime Reporting, 21 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 91, 99 (2001) (concluding that reporting
salient rather than common crimes may convey a message that crime is more pervasive and
relevant to a particular community);.
37.
See Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and
Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in 2 RES. HANDBOOKS ON ECON. OF INTELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at
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particularly salient to the jury’s primary task. Jurors must focus on the accused feature to assess whether it infringes the patent. Meanwhile, information about the thousands of other features is not relevant to infringement.
The only time the juror is asked to consider these features is when the defendant points out that they also contribute value to the product. Thus, a patent infringement trial may create a context where jurors overvalue the infringing feature.

2. Anchoring
Another form of cognitive bias called “anchoring” may also cause juries
to overvalue an infringing feature. Anchoring generally refers to the observation that an initial number inordinately influences an individual’s later
38
numerical determinations. Anchoring effects have previously been demon39
strated in the context of both personal injury and punitive damages cases.
Numerous studies have confirmed that as the demand increases, so does the
award. Indeed, one study’s title provocatively suggests that “the more you
40
ask for, the more you get.” Of course, attorneys are familiar with this phenomenon and often ask for damages awards far in excess of what they think
41
their case is worth or that the jury will issue. Indeed, one might suspect
that is precisely what Apple’s attorneys were doing when they asked for a
$100 royalty on a $199 smartphone for infringing three graphical user inter42
face patents. The surprisingly simple demonstrative exhibit depicted here
was presented during the testimony of Dr. John Hauser, an MIT business
school professor and Apple’s expert. Although Dr. Hauser testified that his
conclusions relied on a sophisticated survey technique called “conjoint
analysis,” his direct testimony lasted less than three minutes. There was no
effort to explain the details of “conjoint analysis.” This may have been due
8-10),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3342570_code1335192.pdf?
abstractid=2900540&mirid=1 (last visited Sept. 30, 2019)(listing studies that identified thousands to hundreds of thousands of patents that potentially cover various technical standards).
38.
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 31, at 1128–30.
39.
Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests
and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV., 445, 463 (1999)
(summarizing several studies).
40.
Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You
Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 522
(1996).
41.
Ken Broda-Brahm, When Arguing Damages, “Drop Anchor” Even in Murky Waters, PERSUASIVE LITIGATOR (Aug. 29, 2011), https://www.persuasivelitigator.com/2011/08/
damages-anchoring.html (“It is now common sense among plaintiffs that you should give jurors an anchor number, especially, for the less evidence-grounded general damages categories.”).
42.
See Dan Levine, Analysis: In Apple v. Samsung, Alchemy of Damages Takes
the Stage, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:31 PM), https://in.reuters.com/article/
idINL2E8JK02J20120822 (noting that the marketing expert from MIT took “all of three
minutes”).
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to time constraints imposed by the court, or it could have been a tactical decision. Apple’s attorneys could have been just trying to anchor the jury in
43
the highest number it could introduce. Shortly thereafter, the jury returned
44
a $1 billion verdict in favor of Apple. In sum, it is these types of inordinately high anchors that may be another factor in disproportionately high
damages awards in multicomponent patent lawsuits.

Figure 1

43.
Samsung unsuccessfully sought to have the expert report on conjoint analysis excluded. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions to Exclude Certain Expert
Opinions, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. LLC., No. 12-cv-00630-LHK (PSG), 2012
WL 3793136, at *27 (Feb. 25, 2014).
44.
See Josh Lowensohn, Jury Awards Apple More Than $1B, Finds Samsung Infringed, CNET (Aug. 24, 2012, 8:02 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jury-orderssamsung-to-pay-1b-to-apple/. That award has been reduced through subsequent litigation and
retrial on damages. Johnny Lieu, Apple Wins $539 Million in Damages in Patent Battle with
Samsung, MASHABLE (May 24, 2018), https://mashable.com/2018/05/24/samsung-appleretrial-decision/.

Fall 2019]

Saliency, Anchors & Frames

13

B. Potential Debiasing Strategies
To the extent that the biases discussed above distort damages determinations, the judicial system should seek ways to either eliminate or reduce
them. We hypothesize how two potential debiasing techniques might work
here.

1. Imposing Frames
Our first proposal takes advantage of the concept of coherence. Studies
have proven that people’s relative valuations appear orderly. For example,
one study showed that while people’s estimates of the price of everyday objects were unduly influenced by an irrelevant number (e.g. writing down
their social security number), the same subjects performed well when asked
45
which items were more or less expensive. This observation suggests that
courts can make jury decision-making more accurate by providing more ref46
erence points. Indeed, the debiasing technique of providing more reference
points has helped decision makers in other areas of the law, such as work47
ers’ compensation and sentencing guidelines.
Here, we suggest that juries can create their own reference points. Judges could instruct jurors to value the feature-at-issue simultaneously with the
other features of the multicomponent device. Currently, jurors are instructed
48
to determine a value for the infringing feature by itself. As a result, the jury’s entire focus is on the infringing feature. By prompting the jurors to value various other features contained in the multicomponent device at the
same time, courts might be able to reduce the saliency bias. This approach is
reinforced by the principle of coherence. A jury verdict form that forces the
jury to simultaneously render decisions on different features necessarily re-

45.
Dan Ariely, George Lowenstein & Drazen Prelec, “Coherent Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand Curves without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. OF ECON. 73, 77 (2003) (“Subjects,
it seems, did not know how much they valued these items, but they did know the relative ordering within the categories of wine and computer accessories.”).
46.
See Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
113, 134–35 (2011) (suggesting that courts should allow defendants in multicomponent patent
lawsuits to implead their suppliers; that will then provide the jury with another important reference point, the price of the component, for calculating damages); Reid Hastie, The Challenge to Produce Useful “Legal Numbers”, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 6, 8-9 (2011) (discussing three approaches to give decision makers more useful information to make numerical
decisions).
47.
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2124-25 (1998); see
also Hillel Bavli & Reagan Mozer, The Effects of Comparable-Case Guidance on Awards for
Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 37
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405 (2019) (showing that mock jury decision were less variable when
given information on prior awards).
48.
See, e.g., Verdict Form, Uniloc U.S.A., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-004 S, 2009
WL 960940 (D.R.I. April 8, 2009).
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quires them to also consider relative valuations. We hypothesize that together these two mechanisms will yield a more accurate valuation for an infringing feature in a multicomponent suit.
In theory, it makes sense to assess the value of a particular feature in the
context of determining the value of all the other inputs to the product simultaneously. This approach is consistent with what others have proposed: assessing damages by determining the incremental value of the patented fea49
ture. Simultaneous valuation has the added benefit of preventing
valuations that lead to unreasonable results – namely, the patent system
should not lead to situations where the sum of the parts are larger (at least
not substantially larger) than the value of the product as a whole.
In practice, neither courts nor researchers can ask people to look at
thousands of features simultaneously. Unless they were heavily invested in
the outcome, people do not have the time or patience to carefully perform
50
these tasks. However, having mock jurors evaluate a few features as part
of the defendant’s case is a closer approximation of the ideal approach than
when the feature is valued alone in the plaintiffs’ case.

2. Exposing the Anchor
One of the authors has previously studied potential strategies to respond
51
to anchoring in the context of medical malpractice lawsuits. The study
tested three potential strategies a defendant might use against a disproportionately high damages demand: 1) offering a significantly lower anchor
(the “counter” condition), 2) not offering an alternative number but critiquing the plaintiffs’ request (the “ignore” condition), and 3) using the plaintiffs’ high demand to attack the plaintiffs’ credibility (the “attack” condi-

49.
Several others have advocated measuring damages based on the incremental value
of the patented technology. See Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework
for RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451, 1499 (2015) (endorsing the incremental value and explicitly excluding switching costs); Taylor infra at note
66 at 95-96 (suggesting that damages based on the value of the patent would be “the amount
of money that a user of patented technology can save or otherwise obtain based upon the difference between a world where the patented technology is used and a world where the patented technology is not used.”).
50.
There are other reasons why this approach might not work. Jurors may suffer from
cognitive overload when they have to value too many features together. See Paul E. Green &
V. Srinivasan, Conjoint Analysis in Marketing: New Developments with Implications for Research and Practice, 54 J. MARKETING 3, 8 (1990) (suggesting that upper limit may be as
small as six people); see also Zelin Yang, Damages Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable
Royalty Damages, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 665 (2014) (discussing how limiting the
number of features may lead to manipulation).
51.
John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson & David Yokum, Countering the Plaintiffs’ Anchor: Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 543 (2016).
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52

tion). Although the study found that countering the plaintiffs’ $5,000,000
demand with a significantly lower number ($50,000) was slightly more effective than attacking the demand, the difference was small. Average damages in the counter condition were $200,261 while they were $341,872 in
53
the attack condition. The anchoring effect dominated the three attempts to
counter it.
Some scholars have suggested that a different tactic might work: edu54
cating jurors about their potential biases. One recent study sought to test
55
this theory in the criminal sentencing context. The experiment tested four
potential responses to a prosecutor’s anchor (i.e. demand for a long sentence): (1) ignoring, (2) identifying, (3) countering (offering a lower alterna56
tive anchor), and (4) identifying and countering. In the two identifying
conditions, defense counsel specifically called out the prosecutor for throwing out a “ridiculously high number” and labeled it “a psychological manip57
ulation.” Interestingly, identifying anchoring by itself had no effect on sentencing outcomes, but when it was combined with a lower anchor, the
defense was able to significantly reduce sentencing outcomes by between
58
37% and 45%. We sought to determine if the same tactic would be effective in determining damages in a multicomponent patent case.

III. The Experiment
Although our primary subject of interest is assessing how juries decide
damages in multicomponent patent cases, our experiment was based on a
product mislabeling case rather than a patent infringement case. Our experimental design required us to identify and describe three different features in
a multicomponent product and repeatedly switch the context in which mock
jurors valued these three features. Thus, in different scenarios, either the
plaintiff or the defendant would be explaining the value of any given feature. When discussing features, we sought to use the same arguments re52.
Id. at 555; see also, Tina L. Decker, Effects of Counter-Anchoring Damages During Closing Argument, 49–50 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas)
(on file with authors).
53.
Campbell et al. supra note 51, at 560.
54.
Rebecca K. Helm, Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, Trial by Numbers, 27
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 132 (2017); Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Effects: Basic Anchoring and Its Antecedents, 125 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 387
(1996) (warning participants about their potential bias mitigated but did not nullify anchoring
biases).
55.
Christopher T. Stein & Michelle Drouin, Cognitive Bias in the Courtroom: Combating the Anchoring Effect in Criminal Sentencing, SSRN (uploaded June 23, 2017)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991611.
56.
Id. at 11.
57.
Id. at 19.
58.
Id. at 31. The 37% reduction occurred in low anchor condition and the 45% reduction occurred in the high anchor condition. Id.
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gardless of whether that feature was being discussed by the plaintiff or the
defendant. Introducing infringement arguments would have frustrated that
design because the parties would never discuss whether features not in suit
infringed a patent. Thus, the product mislabeling lawsuit gave us the best
opportunity to isolate the cognitive biases we were seeking to test.
What follows is a description of the “basic” case that is common to all
the different scenarios mock jurors viewed. The case involves the mislabeling of the fictional Ultra smartphone. Both the marketing and actual packaging mistakenly referred to a feature that was not present in smartphones the
defendant manufacturer sold. The plaintiffs are the class of consumers that
purchased the Ultra smartphone for an average of $489/smartphone. The defendant does not dispute liability. Moreover, both sides agree that the defendant should pay the consumers the difference between the phone as described and the phone as delivered. However, they differ on what that
amount is. In pre-testing, mock jurors sought to punish the defendant for its
conduct when assessing damages. Consequently, the basic case was revised
to include facts that minimized the defendant’s blame. The defendant sent
accurate instructions to a third-party marketing company that made the mistake. Unfortunately, that party is bankrupt, and the defendant manufacturer
has willingly accepting responsibility but is disputing the value of the missing feature.
All the different versions consist of three narrated PowerPoint parts: a
judge, the plaintiffs’ attorney and the defendant’s attorney. The presenta59
tions were combined and rendered into a single video. A judge introduces
the basic dispute and provides short jury instructions after the two sides’ arguments. The plaintiff points to various benefits that the promised featureat-issue has and asks the jury to award $99 per smartphone. In response, the
defendant downplays the significance of the missing feature-at-issue’s benefits and points to all the other features found in the smartphone. As part of
this argument, the defendant highlights three particular features found in the
smartphone and also briefly mentions a host of other important features that
contribute to the value of the smartphone. The defendant’s bottom line is
that $99 is far too much given the countless number of features in the
smartphone, and the defendant suggests that $4.85/smartphone should be
60
sufficient compensation. Just as they would in a real trial, mock jurors
were then asked to assess damages by determining the value of the missing
feature. But unlike in a real trial, we also asked mock jurors to estimate the
value of the other features that the defendant specifically identified as contributing to the value of the smartphone and everything else (i.e., all the un-

59.
Each presentation used a different person’s voice to help participants distinguish
between the different roles of judge, plaintiffs’ counsel, and defendant’s counsel.
60.
While pre-testing the experiment, the defendant suggested that $1.25 should be sufficient compensation. However, several mock jurors suggested that $1.25 was absurdly low.
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mentioned features) that went into the smartphone. As explained below,
these questions were asked in three different ways.
The task that our mock jurors were given is substantially similar to what
real patent juries must do when they decide damages in a multicomponent
case. First, in patent cases, the balance of the case focuses on the infringing
feature. Here, the balance of the case focused on the missing feature. Second, the patent plaintiff typically demands a relatively large royalty as a
percentage of the overall product. Here, the plaintiffs asked for $99 in damages. Since the smartphone sold for $489, the request was slightly less than
20% of the price of the smartphone. We selected that number because it
seemed irrationally high, but still within the range of what a plaintiff might
61
actually request. Third, defendants in patent cases invariably attempt to
diminish the value of the infringing feature by pointing to everything else
found in the infringing product. The defendant in our case discussed three
other particular features that contributed to the value of the smartphone and
briefly mentioned several other categories of features as well.

A. The Manipulations
In order to test the cognitive biases and various potential counters described above, manipulations were made in three different dimensions. This
allowed us to conduct a 3x3x2 between-subjects experiment with a total of
18 experimental conditions as illustrated in Table 1. We describe each of the
manipulations in more detail below.

Table 1
Experimental Conditions

Ind5/
No Debias
Tog5/
No Debias
Tog8/
No Debias
Ind5/
Debias Anchor
Tog5/
Debias Anchor
Tog8/
Debias Anchor

Camera
1

Storage
7

Security
13

2

8

14

3

9

15

4

10

16

5

11

17

6

12

18

61.
Since Lemley and Shapiro observed that damages average slightly less than 10% in
multicomponent cases, a damages demand reflecting slightly less than 20% of the product’s
price seemed realistic. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
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1. Testing Saliency & Anchors (x3)
Our first manipulation involved three Ultra smartphone features: (A)
the camera quality (12-megapixel vs. 8-megapixel), (B) the amount of storage capacity (128 gigabyte vs. 96 gigabyte), and (C) the type of encryption
technology (6-key vs. 4-key).
Early testing of our experiment revealed that some mock jurors thought
that the defendant should fix the problem by adding features through a software upgrade. To eliminate this possibility, all the features that were involved in the final experiment were part of the smartphone’s hardware. The
defendant’s presentation also informs the mock jurors that it could not simply substitute a smartphone with the missing feature because the defendant
actually did not make such a phone.
In the first version, the misrepresentation related to the type of built-in
62
camera. The packaging and advertising said that the smartphone had a 12megapixel camera when it really only had an 8-megapixel camera. The
plaintiff explains why this feature is beneficial and demands $99/unit. The
defendant responds, in part, by pointing to other features to suggest that the
smartphone is far more than its camera. Among those features are the large
128 GB storage capacity and the sophisticated 6-key encryption. The defendant argues that $4.85/unit is entirely adequate to compensate the plaintiffs.
nd
In the 2 version of this manipulation, we rotate the storage capacity into the plaintiffs’ case while rotating the camera feature out of the plaintiffs’
63
rd
case and into the defendant’s case. In the 3 version, we rotate the 6-key
encryption feature into the plaintiffs’ case while the defendant discusses the
64
other two features.
Since we ask mock jurors to assess damages based on the missing feature and to value the other features as well, we can observe if the value of
each feature changes based on the context. Our hypothesis is that mock jurors would assign more value when each feature is the focus of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. That would suggest that a combination of the saliency effect
and anchoring is pushing damages upwards.
We selected these three features because they represented a range of
different values. Presumably, most customers understand the value of more
memory and believe it is useful. Thus, we expected that mock jurors would
award slightly higher damages for this feature. However, it was unclear to
us that people would think that a 12-megapixel camera was significantly
more valuable than an 8-megapixel camera. While almost everyone uses the
62.
63.
64.

Conditions 1-6.
Conditions 7-12.
Conditions 13-18.
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camera in their smartphones, most people don’t need an extremely highquality image. Thus, we expected mock jurors to award slightly less damages for the less powerful camera. Finally, we thought that so long as the
smartphone was password protected, most people would not care about the
number of digits comprising the password. Accordingly, we expected damages for the difference between the 6-key password and 4-key password to
be nominal.
Because only the plaintiff suggested that particular features were worth
$99, this manipulation only allowed us to measure the combined effect of
any saliency and anchoring biases. While we could have designed an experiment that attempted to isolate the saliency effect from anchoring, we chose
a design that more closely approximated how damages are litigated in real
cases.

2. Jury Verdicts (x3)
A second manipulation focused on a potential counter to the anchoring
bias. This counter attempted to change the way mock jurors assessed damages. First, our control condition (Independent 5) reflected the way real jurors assess damages. The verdict simply asked the mock juror to assess
damages on the feature-in-suit – either the camera, storage, or security feature. The specific instructions told mock jurors to measure damages by
comparing the difference between what was promised and what was re65
ceived. After that task was complete, mock jurors were sent to another
page (that did not permit backtracking). This page asked the mock juror to
rank the value of the feature-in-suit, the two features that were the subject of
defendant’s presentation (two of camera, storage, and security that were not
the feature-in-suit) as well as improved voice recognition software, and
“[t]he combination of everything else in the Ultra Smartphone.” They were
then asked to assess how valuable the three features and “everything else”
were in dollars.
In a second condition (Together 5), we asked the mock jurors to perform all the same tasks in our first condition except we asked them to rank
65.
This instruction looks much like a patent jury instruction would if it focused on the
next best non-infringing alternative, an idea many commentators have endorsed. See, e.g.,
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2039 (“the danger that reasonable royalties will be set too
high in component cases will be sharply reduced if the courts base their estimates of reasonable royalties on an assessment of the value of the patented component in comparison with the
next best, noninfringing alternative way to create that component”); Douglas A. Melamed &
William F. Lee, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385,
422 (2016) (“Properly understood, however, the alternatives put a ceiling on the amount a
willing licensee would pay ex ante because it would not pay more than the patent is worth
com-pared the alternative of not taking a license.”); David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 96 (2014) (“All approaches consider
the value of the patented technology as compared with the next best alternative technology . . .”).
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the five items first and then value the five items together (including the fea66
ture-in-suit). In scenarios with this condition, the final instruction in the
jury verdict form said, “Please tell us what damages you award the plaintiffs
as well as what value you attributed to other features of the Ultra
smartphone that defendants identified.” The feature-in-suit was listed followed by each of the other features identified.
Our third condition (Together 8) was substantially like our second con67
dition. However, three more features that the defendant briefly mentioned
were added to the jury verdict form. They were: “the tempered shatter resistant glass”, “the user-friendly backup system,” and “allowing the
smartphone to communicate over wireless networks” (i.e., Wi-Fi).
By asking the jury to assess the value of the other features at the same
time they assessed damages for the feature-at-issue, the jury verdict manipulation allowed us to examine whether forcing context on the mock juror’s
decision making process results in a lower damages award than it otherwise
would. Our hypothesis is that mock jurors will place a lower value on the
feature-at-issue when valuing all of the features together as compared to
valuing the feature-at-issue individually without consideration of the other
features not at issue in the case. We also suspect that adding more features
to the jury form will increase that effect.

3. The Defendant’s Argument (x2)
To test whether defendants could debias the plaintiffs’ anchor with an
argument that specifically says the plaintiff is using an anchor, we created
two experimental conditions. In the control condition, the defendant said
nothing about anchoring. However, in the “Debias Anchor” condition, the
defendant smartphone manufacturer argued that: “[t]he plaintiffs are only
throwing out the $100 number to anchor your view in this ridiculously high
number; it is a well-known psychological manipulation.” If the results of
previous studies are true, our hypothesis is that mock jurors will return a
lower damages award in the trial variants that include the counter-anchor
argument as compared to the trial variants that do not include the counteranchor argument.

B. The Mock Jurors
In the summer of 2018, we performed an online 3x3x2 betweensubjects experiment. Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk, an online crowd-sourcing marketplace, and each participant was paid

66.
67.

Conditions 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, and 17.
Conditions 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18.
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$3.00 each. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 18 experimental conditions. In our initial experiment, we had an implementation is69
sue with four of our experimental conditions. Consequently, we dropped
all the data from those four conditions and ran them again. We then combined the two data sets for our analysis. Although this approach means that
the randomization was less than ideal, we have no reason to believe that the
two populations were systematically different.
Depending on the condition, mock jurors watched a video that lasted
between 10 minutes 36 seconds to 14 minutes and 3 seconds. Together
1,059 mock jurors (847 in the first run and 212 in the second run) passed
two attention check questions and were allowed to submit a verdict. We
then ran a series of quality checks. The quality checks were designed to
eliminate mock jurors who did not take the task seriously. First, we disqualified mock jurors that valued too many features as $0 on the theory that they
were rushing through the verdict form without really considering the value
of all the features. For the Independent5 and Together5 jury verdict forms,
we excluded mock jurors that valued three or more at $0. For the Together8
scenario, we excluded mock jurors that valued five or more items at $0.
This filter disqualified sixty-eight mock jurors. We also disqualified another
four mock jurors that valued the feature-in-suit at $0 on the theory that they
were not taking the jury instructions seriously. Finally, we disqualified another fourteen mock jurors who valued any single feature at $489 or above
for the same reason, since the entire smartphone itself was valued at $489
(and both plaintiff and defendant stipulated to this fact). This left 973 valid
responses.
Of the valid responses, 497 participants identified as female, 474 identified as male, and 2 identified as neither. The sample was younger, more educated, less racially diverse, and more politically liberal than the population

68.
Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”) has become a large and robust platform for social science research, with proven reliability through the replication of many known results. See Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor Markets for
Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 362–63
(2012) (successfully replicating three experiments using MTurk); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse
Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 415-17 (2010) (replicating three classical experiment
on MTurk and finding that MTurk workers “exhibit the class heuristics, biases and pay attention to directions at least as much as subjects from traditional sources”).
69.
In two cases, we omitted the link to the video and mock jurors assigned to those
conditions understandably failed attention checks. In two others conditions, we realized that
the jury verdict form did not precisely match those in other conditions. Consequently, we discarded the data from those conditions, reran conditions 8, 9, 11 & 12, and combined the two
datasets. While having our respondents divided in non-random fashion is obviously not ideal,
we have no reason to believe that the two MTurk respondent pools were systematically different.
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at large; gender and median income, however, were more representative of
70
the U.S. Census data.

IV. Results
Although our results were consistent with what Lemley & Shapiro observed for real patent awards, the results of our experiment still surprised
71
us. Given that the average price of the Ultra smartphone was $489, we
were struck by the large size of the awards in all the conditions. As shown
in Table 2 below, damages for the higher resolution camera (12-megapixel
vs. 8-megapixel) were $68.59 (n=308). Damages for the higher storage
amount were $57.80 (n=299). As predicted, the lowest damages awards
were for the increased security feature (6-digit encryption vs. 4-digit encryption), but they were still $43.49 (n=366).
Given the tens of thousands of features in a smartphone, we were quite
surprised that at least some of these numbers weren’t much lower. Perhaps
the price of the security feature was the most surprising. We attempted to
identify both features that consumers valued (i.e. more storage) and those
that they did not value at all (i.e. 6-digit passcode vs 4-digit passcode to unlock a smartphone) with the higher resolution camera falling somewhere in
the middle. As it turns out, mock jurors viewed the high-resolution camera
as the most valuable of the three tested features.

A. Features Are More Valuable in the Plaintiffs’ Case
Our first hypothesis is that a combination of saliency bias and anchoring increases damages awards. To test this theory, we compared the damages that mock jurors awarded when the feature was part of the plaintiffs’ suit
with the value when mock jurors assessed that feature when it was part of
the defendant’s suit.
For two of the three features (camera and security), the values decreased significantly when they were moved from the plaintiffs’ case to the
defendant’s case. However, for our third feature, storage, we found no effect
at all. These results are depicted in Table 2 below. The first column represents the average value of the feature when it was the feature-in-suit (i.e.
part of the plaintiffs’ case). The second column represents the average value
of the same feature when the defendant discussed that feature in order to

70.
Specifically, the sample demographics are as follows: mean and median age 36.33
and 34 years, respectively; 81.4% White, 9.5% African American, 5.3% Asian, 1.4% American Indian, and the remainder classified as Other; 7.8% Hispanic; 51.5% with a bachelor’s
degree or higher; and 52.2% preferred Democrats, 28.8% preferred Republicans, and 19% had
no political preference.
71.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2 at 2032 tbl.1 (observing an average royalty rate of
9.98% for a single component in a larger multicomponent product).
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minimize the value of the feature-in-suit. Both the first and second columns
also contain the number of participants (n) representing that category. The
third and fourth columns contain calculations to determine statistical signif72
icance using t-tests.

Table 2
Average Damages, Feature-in-Suit vs. Feature Not in Suit

Camera
Storage
Security

Plaintiff
Average
(n)
$65.89
(308)
$57.80
(299)
$43.49
(366)

Defendant
Average
(n)
$56.95
(665)
$60.84
(674)
$23.46
(607)

p-value
(t-test)
p < 0.001
p = 0.34
p < 1.5e-15

Effect Size 95%
Confidence Intervals
-$3.49
-$14.40
$9.28
-$3.19
-$15.23
-$24.81

The average value of the higher quality camera decreased 13.57%. In
absolute terms, that was an $8.94 reduction with a 95% confidence interval
that the effect was between -$3.49 and -$14.40. As for percentage of overall
value, the average value of the improved security feature had a much larger
drop in value, 46.1% which represented a $20.03 decrease. The 95% confidence interval was -$15.23 to - $24.81. In both cases, the results yielded extremely low p values providing a high level of confidence in the findings.
Thus, these two comparisons support our hypothesis. Some combination of
the saliency bias and anchoring effect cause mock jurors to value the two
features higher when it is part of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
However, the results for the storage feature were not consistent with
this hypothesis. When the storage feature was at issue, the average damages
value was $57.80, whereas the average damages value for the storage feature when it was not at issue was $60.84. Indeed, the minimal difference
suggests that the saliency bias and anchoring effect might not be operating
in this context. However, we did see an effect when we examined how
mock jurors ranked the value of the different features.

72.
We did not perform a regression analysis comparing the feature in suit vs. value
when it was not in suit. Such an analysis would require us to use each response three times,
once for the feature in suit, and again for each of the other features. The value of the feature in
suit and features NOT in suit are related because the total will presumably be close to the value of the entire product, $489. For the results of a standard regression analysis to be reliable,
the different outcomes have to be independent. Thus, a regression analysis was not appropriate here.
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After they determined damages, mock jurors were also asked to rank
the value of the different features in the smartphone from highest to lowest.
In two of the three jury verdict forms (Traditional and Together5), mock jurors ranked five features: the three features of interest (camera, storage, and
security) as well as the “newest and most accurate voice recognition software” and “a combination of everything else that went in the []
smartphone.” In the Together8 jury verdict, we added three more features
for the mock jury to rank. They were: “tempered shatter resistant glass,”
“user friendly backup system,” and “[a]llowing the smartphone to communicate over wireless networks (in other words Wi-Fi).” The results are
73
shown in Table 3 below. The first number shows the average rank for the
feature in interest, the second number shows how many features participants
were asked to rank in that experimental condition and the third number in
parentheticals shows how many valid responses are found in that condition.
Comparing the ranking of the three primary features when they were
part of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit against their ranking when they were part of
the defendant’s suit gives us another way to test the combination of saliency
and anchoring. In every case, the ranking of the feature was higher when it
was part of the plaintiff’s case than when it was part of the defendant’s case.
Moreover, we performed a Wilcoxon rank-sum test that showed that all the
results were statistically significant (p < .0001).

Table 3
Average Ranking for Each Feature

Camera Trad/Together5
Camera Together
Storage Trad/Together5
Storage Together8
Security Trad/Together5
Security Together8

Ranking in Plaintiffs’
Case (n)
1.74/5 (201)
2.22/8 (95)
1.81/5 (208)
2.42/8 (81)
2.73/5 (251)
3.50/8 (106)

Ranking in Defendant’s
Case (n)
2.78/5 (459)
3.35/8 (187)
2.35/5 (461)
2.87/8 (201)
3.88/5 (418)
5.09/8 (176)

(p < .0001 for all comparisons between Ranking Plaintiffs’ case and Ranking Defendant’s case).
Notably, unlike our monetary value analysis, the ranking of the storage
feature dropped significantly when it was moved from the plaintiffs’ case to
the defendant’s case. These results certainly suggest that mock jurors think
about features differently when they are part of the plaintiffs’ case as op-

73.
The total number of participants in Table 3 was 951, 23 less than in Table 2 which
indicates that 22 mock jurors completed the valuation question and then dropped out before
completing the ranking questions.
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posed to being part of the defendant’s case. Oddly, that different perspective
does not always affect monetary valuations. We can theorize why the valuation of the storage feature did not change when it moved to the defendant’s
case. First, the amount of storage may be one of the few features that mock
jurors have experience valuing. Smartphones often price different models
with different amounts of storage. Although those pricing differences often
represent more than storage, mock jurors may not understand that subtlety,
or they may simply be using those prices as reference points. Indeed, it is
possible that mock jurors did a quick online search to see how storage was
priced. In contrast, mock jurors are probably less familiar with the number
of megapixels in their smartphone camera, and even if they are, it is unclear
how to tease out the price of that feature from different smartphone models.
Finally, jurors are probably the least familiar with how much more valuable
6-digit encryption is as compared to 4-digit encryption. In fact, we simply
made up this feature believing that mock jurors will attach very little value
to it. Thus, it may be that the cognitive biases play a larger role in decision
making when individuals have less personal information they can access.
Finally, we should note that our results probably underestimate the real
size of the saliency/anchoring effect. That is because the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s valuation arguments were not precisely the same. Specifically, the
defendant explained why the feature-in-suit was not valuable. However,
there was no counterpart to this argument in the plaintiffs’ case. The plaintiff never argued that the “other” features that the defendant discussed were
not valuable. If we assume that the defendant’s arguments placed some
downward pressure on the mock juror’s valuations of the feature-in-suit, the
value of the features at issue were lower than they otherwise would have
been. Of course, we could have omitted the defendant’s argument. However, the omission of such an obvious argument has its dangers too. Mock jurors might have interpreted that omission to be a concession that the plaintiffs’ arguments were correct. Consequently, we chose to keep the
argument. This had the added benefit of making our presentation more realistic.

B. Valuing Multiple Features Together Reduced Damages
Our second hypothesis was that requiring mock jurors to assess multiple
features simultaneously would reduce any saliency effect by focusing their
attention on the value of other features and forcing to think coherently about
the value of different features. In short, we found that our novel jury verdict
form reduced damages modestly.
The results of varying the jury verdicts are found in Table 4. The second column shows the average damages awards relying on the traditional
jury verdict form, which simply asks the jury to determine damages for the
feature-in-suit. The damages for three features are $68.25 for the higher resolution camera, $61.79 for the additional storage, and $46.95 for the im-
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proved security feature. The Together5 column provides the average damages for the same features when the jury verdict form asked mock jurors to
rank five features and then value those five features together. Damages were
uniformly smaller ($66.52 for the camera, $56.96 for storage, and $39.15
for security), but the differences were not large and in fact quite small for
the camera, $1.73.

Table 4
Average Damages by Jury Verdict Form
Together5
Avg. Damages
(n)

Together8
Avg. Damages
(n)

Camera

Independent
Avg. Damages
(Traditional)
(n)
$68.25 (108)

$66.52 (106)

$62.65 (97)

Storage

$61.79 (119)

$56.96 (95)

$53.15 (85)

Security

$46.95 (131)

$39.15 (126)

$44.34 (109)

Two results stand out. The traditional verdict form yields the highest result for every feature. But there does not appear to be much difference between the Together5 and Together8 verdicts. We performed a regression
analysis to see if these differences were significant. In our basic model, the
74
average damages were $69.34 when the traditional verdict was used. The
Together5 verdict form decreased damages by $5.04, but the results were
75
not quite statistically significant (p=.09). The Together8 verdict had a
slightly larger effect lowering damages by $5.44, but again this effect was
not quite statistically significant (p=.08). In an attempt to obtain more statistical power, we combined the results of Together 5 and Together 8. This
model predicted that when mock jurors had to value other features together
with the feature-in-suit, the together verdict forms lowered damages by
$5.44. Presumably because of larger combined sample size, these results
76
were statistically significant (p=.049).
In short, we found that changing the jury verdict form to require the jurors to value many features together lowered damages modestly. A superficial look at the descriptive statistics also might suggest that the more fea-

74.
See Table 2 in Appendix A.
75.
See Table 3 in Appendix A. The 95% confidence interval was between -15.9% and
+1.4%.
76.
Id. The 95% confidence interval suggested that the together verdict forms reduced
damages between -15.1% to -0.03%.
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tures jurors value, the lower the damages. While that may very well be true,
our results say nothing about this hypothesis. Our sample size was too small
to determine if differences of these sizes were significant.

C. Exposing the Anchor Had No Effect
Our third hypothesis is that mock jurors would be less susceptive to an
anchor if they were expressly told about that bias. Consequently, in half of
our scenarios, the defendant accused the plaintiffs of asking for an irrationally high damages number to “anchor” mock jurors around that number.
We found no statistical differences when the defendant explicitly called
out the plaintiffs for anchoring. As Table 5 illustrates, when the defendant
employed the debiasing technique, average damages decreased between
$0.22 and $5.23 depending on the feature at issue. Using t-tests we calculated 95% confidence intervals. All the intervals crossed zero indicating that
none of these decreases were statistically significant. Our regression analysis examined conditions for each feature in suit, but it also failed to find a
77
significant effect.

Table 5
Debiasing the Anchoring Effect
Control
Average
(n)
Camera
Storage
Security

Debias Anchor
Average
(n)
$65.78
(149)
$57.72
(148)
$40.80
(178)

$66.00
(159)
$57.88
(152)
$46.03
(188)

p-value

95% Confidence
Intervals

0.96

$-7.71 to $8.14

0.97

$-9.60 to $9.92

0.22

$-3.18 to $13.66

In short, we did not find that exposing the plaintiffs’ anchor in combination
with providing a lower counter anchor reduced damages as compared to
simply providing a lower counter anchor.

D. Demographics
Before the experiment began, we asked a variety of basic demographic
questions. The only area where we found significant demographic effects
was in political ideology. Mock jurors were asked to identify their political
preference on a seven-point Likert scale: Strong Democrats, Democrats,

77.

See Table 1 in Appendix A.
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Slight Democrats, No Preference, Slight Republicans, Republicans, and
Strong Republicans. Our regression analysis showed that jurors who favored
Democrats awarded higher damages than jurors who favored Republicans.
For example, the difference between those jurors that strongly favored
Democrats and the different categories of Republicans ranged from $12.85
78
to 16.07. Other empirical studies regarding civil litigation damages awards
show similar effects of Republican mock-jurors awarding lower damages
79
than Democrat mock-jurors.

E. Mock Jury Comments
We asked mock jurors to provide written comments about the basis for
their decisions and their views on the case. These comments revealed some
interesting insights on how mock jurors made their decisions. In particular,
their comments revealed a disconnect between the jury instructions and the
decisions that at least some mock jurors made.
Both the judge and the jury verdict forms instructed mock jurors to assess damages by determining the difference in value between “what the
80
plaintiffs were promised” and “what they actually received.” This instruc81
tion was designed to mimic the question that patent cases ask. We were
curious whether mock jurors would follow these instructions as they made
their damages determinations. Other studies have shown that jurors sometimes do not follow instructions and simply rely on their own intuitions
82
about what is just.
To get a sense of what motivated the decision of our mock jurors, we
asked them to answer three questions after they filled out the jury verdict

78.
See Table 4 in Appendix A.
79.
See, e.g., Hastie, supra note 39, at 455 (“One other individual difference, political
preference, appeared to be related to awards when considered by itself; Republicans set lower
awards than mock-jurors with more liberal political orientations (r = +.21, p < .05), although
this variable did not enter significantly into the summary linear model.”).
80.
For example, the jury verdict form for the camera scenario with the traditional verdict form that only asked for the jury to calculate damages said “To determine the plaintiffs’
damages, you must determine the difference in value in what the plaintiffs were promised, an
Ultra smartphone with a 12-Megapixel camera, and what they actually received, an Ultra
smartphone with a 8-Megapixel camera. What damages do you award the plaintiffs for each
smartphone they purchased?” The judge gave a similar instruction verbally during his presentation.
81.
The Supreme Court has defined patent damages in terms of its compensatory function – that is, “the difference between [the patent owner’s] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.”
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964).
82.
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Deterrence Instructions: What Jurors Won’t Do, in
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 142, 164 (Cass Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (finding
that mock jurors “appear quite willing to abandon the jury instructions when they have other
rationales for setting punitive damages that they find to be either more convenient or more
compelling.”).
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form. The first question asked mock jurors to, “[e]xplain why you gave the
plaintiff the amount you did.” The second and third questions asked them to
“[e]xplain what you thought” of the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s arguments.
The following responses suggest that many jurors appeared to try to faithfully follow the instructions.
Juror 73

Memory is one of the most expensive upgrades in new phones,
market rate is about $100 to go from 64 to 128 GB. So going
from 96 to 128 should be about $50.

Juror 704

The difference in price, according to the plaintiff, between a 4character passcode Ultra smartphone and a 6-character passcode
Ultra smartphone is $99. That means plaintiffs should receive
the difference in the price between what they paid for what they
were getting and what they actually got.

Juror 796

I chose that amount because I felt that was the amount the extra
storage was worth. I also chose that amount because I felt customers would have paid less if they knew about the true storage.

However, other mock jurors appeared to ignore the jury instructions and
assessed damages based on other factors. Many of these mock jurors focused on the defendant’s blameworthy conduct. These mock jurors wanted
to either punish the defendant or deter the defendant or others from engaging in this kind of conduct again. The following comments are representative of this view.
Juror 215

Customers chose to buy this phone because it had that security
feature which didn’t exist. The company misrepresented the
phone.

Juror 237

I believe that the damages sustained by the plaintiff are negligible, and that even $5 was perhaps being a bit too generous.
There should, however, be some compensation for a falsely advertised feature than [sic] cannot be changed.

Juror 641

Yes, the smartphone has other important features but they intended to mislabel the boxes to mislead their customers, they are
untrustworthy and should be punished.

We observed these kinds of punitive responses in pre-testing and modified our basic case to minimize the manufacturer’s fault by placing all the
blame on a negligent third-party contractor that was now bankrupt. Apparently, this revision was not entirely effective. Some jurors still found sufficient fault with the defendant and apparently calculated damages based on
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blameworthiness. These comments are consistent with the Hans-Reyna gist83
based model of decision-making. That model suggests that jurors engage
in gist-based reasoning (i.e. damages should be low, medium or high) to determine damage awards. Once they determine damages are warranted, they
will make an ordinal gist judgment about the amount of damages that are
84
appropriate (e.g. low or high). As part of that process, jurors will consider
85
the defendant’s culpability (e.g. degree of negligence).
This is an example of fusion, a process where jurors allow evidence of
liability to influence damage decisions or evidence of damages to influence
86
liability decisions. For our purposes, the most relevant studies have found
that mock jurors tend to award higher damages when the underlying con87
duct is more blameworthy. In our case, this appears to be true even when
the level of culpability was small.
But the high average damage awards are clearly not entirely attributable
to the defendant’s bad conduct. If we look back at the first set of comments
above, we observe that some mock jurors appeared to faithfully follow the
jury instructions and still arrived at substantial damages numbers. Still other
jurors appeared to simply split the difference between what the plaintiffs
demanded and what the defendant suggested was fair. Below are two representative comments.
Jury 692

i [sic] felt that $99 was too high so I just split the amount. I feel
the customer’s [sic] could have returned the phone.

Juror 832

. . . . What the defendant suggests is an appropriate reparation
(appx $4 and some change) does not seem adequate given the
significant different [sic] in storage that was promised; yeah,
they didn’t intend on falsely advertising their product, but they
are ultimately responsible for their product—including managing all parties involved with the marketing of their product. The

83.
See Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to
Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 146
(2011).
84.
Id. at 129-30.
85.
Valerie F. Reyna et al., The Gist of Juries: Testing a Model of Damage Award Decision Making, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 280, 291 (2015) (describing an experiment
where jury perceptions of negligence predicted damages awards).
86.
See Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Fusion of Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 125–39 (2001) (fusion refers
both to the concept that liability facts influence jury decision on damages and that damage
facts influence their decision on liability).
87.
See, e.g., John M. Darley & Charles W. Huff, Heightened Damage Assessment as a
Result of the Intentionality of the Damaging-Causing Act, BRIT. J. OF PSYCHOL. 29, 181-88
(1990) (showing higher damages when defendant’s actions were more intentional); Chapman
& Bornstein, supra note 40, (clearer evidence of the danger of birth control pills caused jurors
to give higher damages); Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB.
L. REV. 744, 760 (1959) (clearer evidence of liability led to higher compensatory damages).
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plaintiffs’ demand for $99 also felt excessive because, again, in
the actual sense—they got what they paid for. But I also understand they may have chosen a different product if they realized
the product was not what it seemed, so I empathize with them on
that point. Given that there is some merit to both arguments, I
decided to split down the middle (roughly) at $40.

Others have also found that some jurors tend to “split the baby” and make
88
decisions that reflects compromises. This shows one way anchoring can
work to increase damages. When a plaintiff asks for an irrationally high
number, that will push the mid-point higher. This tactic does work as well
for defendants. While a defendant could respond by suggesting an irrationally low damages award, it faces a lower bound, zero. In cases where damages might reasonably be close to zero, the defendant cannot suggest a far
lower number.
Still other mock juries considered categories of damages that were not
found in the instruction. Specifically, they wanted to compensate the plaintiffs for the inconvenience associated with receiving a phone without all the
promised features.
Juror 24I

. . ., although I realize that the camera probably does not cost
$99 on it’s [sic] own, it is very expensive to get a smartphone,
and you should get what is advertised when you purchase one.
If you do not receive what was advertised you have to go
through the hassle of returning the phone, and then finding a
new phone and purchasing that phone, or simply living with
the phone you bought that doesn’t actually have the features
that you wanted.

Juror 808

I gave them the amount I did ($40) because I figured that was
roughly the amount that was fair for the inconvenience of receiving less storage than they originally believed, but wasn’t
the most important reason for purchasing this phone.

In short, while our experiment has shown that a combination of the saliency and anchoring effects likely increase damages assessments for individual components, our qualitative data suggests there are likely other factors
that contribute to high valuations. Jurors may be awarding damages for cat-

88.
See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, ContextDependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 287, 301 (1996) (describing
two experiments that show that subjects were more like to choose a verdict when it was a
compromise between more extreme choices); Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 47,
at 2132 (“In the context of pain-and-suffering awards, anchors appear to be especially important . . . Some jurors appear to split the difference between the figures suggested by the
plaintiff and the defendant . . . .”).
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egories that are not permitted under the law. These include punitive damages and incidental damages (i.e. for the hassle of getting the wrong phone).

V. Limitations
First, we tested the combined effect of saliency and anchoring together.
In other words, we never isolated either bias individually. We did this consciously in an attempt to make this experiment as realistic as we could. In
theory, it would have been possible to isolate the saliency effect by eliminating the patentee’s anchor is some experimental conditions. However, that
never happens in real cases. The patentee always asks the jury for a specific
damages number. Likewise, it would also be possible for the defendant to
tell the jury what value the other features (not in suit) were worth. But it
would have been unrealistic for the defendant to say that features not in suit
were worth $99. A real defendant would undoubtedly have used a much
smaller number for each of the other features that contributed value to the
smartphone. Comparing the value of a particular feature as it moved between plaintiffs’ case and defendant’s case under these circumstances would
have been unhelpful. Perhaps, in future experiments, subjects could determine the value of features outside the context of a trial in a way that would
allow us to test each bias separately. We leave that possibility for the future.
But for now, we can only say that saliency and anchoring together increase
mock jury valuations.
Second, we asked mock jurors to evaluate the value of different features
in the context of a product misrepresentation case instead of a patent case.
While there were legitimate logistical reasons for doing so, there are undoubtedly significant differences between these kinds of lawsuits. Indeed,
the qualitative comments from our experiment showed that many mock jurors did not just focus on the value of the features at interest. Instead, their
damages calculation considered the defendant’s culpability, which was
unique to the misrepresentation context. We suspect that similar lines of
thinking might influence patent juries. While patent juries may be instructed
to focus on the value of the infringing feature, they may assess damages by
considering why the defendant failed to avoid infringement. More work
needs to be done to verify this hypothesis.
Third, we did not discuss the three extra features (tempered glass, backup system, and Wi-Fi/Bluetooth communications) that were part of the Together8 verdict form. Thus, a reason why we may not have seen a significant effect between the Together5 and Together8 verdict forms is because
of a lack of saliency of the three extra features in the mock trial. If the defendant had discussed these three extra features in detail (like the defendant
did with the other 4 features – camera, storage, security, and voice recognition), then we may have seen a greater allocation of value to those three features, thereby further decreasing the damages award for the feature-at-issue.
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Fourth, our experiment condensed a trial to roughly ten to fourteen
minutes of narrated PowerPoint slides. The respondents were not able to see
the attorneys, experts, or judge and witness their body language during the
presentation at the trial, which can affect the verdict in many cases. This abbreviated format allowed us to utilize a randomized controlled trial experi89
mental design, which is the gold standard for scientific research. However,
there are still reasonable concerns about whether shortening the trial will
change the way individuals make decisions.
Fifth, we did not study real jurors. Prior research has shown that “the
population of Mechanical Turk is at least as representative of the U.S. popu90
lation as traditional subject pools.” Known experimental results have been
91
replicated using the MTurk population. Nonetheless, MTurkers may be
more easily distracted from the trial compared to real jurors and may even
provide junk responses (e.g., those who failed to watch the entire video
without hearing all the arguments and rendered a verdict). It may be that real jurors are more earnest in their efforts to provide meaningful responses or
that real jurors determine liability differently knowing that the outcomes
will affect real individuals and companies.
Lastly, our study involved single mock jurors. Consequently, our mock
jurors did not deliberate with other jurors as they would do in a real trial.
Nonetheless, others have shown that individual juror decisions are quite
predictive of jury decisions. Dennis Devine summarized the literature by
saying, “[r]esearch has consistently shown a strong and robust relationship
between the verdict preferred by the majority of jurors at the start of delib92
eration and the jury’s ultimate verdict.” With respect to damages, the work
that has been done suggests that individual juror decisions underestimate
93
what juries will decide after deliberation. If this held true for valuing indi-

89.
As we mentioned earlier, our experiment was not randomized perfectly because of
a failure in four conditions of our first attempt. See supra note 71.
90.
Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, supra note 70, at 411.
91.
Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, supra note 70, at 61–65 (2012).
92.
Dennis J. Devine, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE, 158
(2012); see also Maggie Wittlin, The Results of Deliberation, 15 U.N.H. L. REV. 161, 185
(2017) (summarizing studies that show that individual juror decisions are predictive of jury
decisions).
93.
See id. at 176 (“deliberating tends to increase jury awards in relation to the mean of
the jurors’ predeliberation amount preferences”); see also Shari S. Diamond, Michael J. Saks
& Stephan Landsman, Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability
and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 316 (1998) (“jury awards in this
case were higher than the average mean and median juror awards, a pattern found in several
other studies of damage awards”); Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the
Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
513, 553 (1992) (“A clear inflation of damage awards occurred between the individual and the
group level. On average the juries produced awards about $56,000 (or 26%) higher than the
average of their members prior to deliberation.”).
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vidual features in complex products, that would suggest that juries would
award even higher damages for individual features.

VI. Implications
A. Valuing a Multicomponent Feature
Our results showed that mock jurors value some features more when the
plaintiffs argued that the feature is valuable than when the defendant made
the same argument. Because the arguments did not change from plaintiff to
defendant, the difference in valuations cannot be attributed to the merits of
any particular argument. Instead, we suggest that a combination of saliency
and anchoring is distorting mock jurors’ decisions. While we uniformly
found this affect when we examined how mock jurors ranked the relative
value of the different features, we did not observe changes in monetary valuation in the experimental conditions concerning the storage feature. But it
is very unlikely that the two positive results were mere flukes. The statistical analysis showed that there was less than a 1 in 1000 likelihood that the
finding with respect to the camera feature was due to chance. Moreover, the
finding with respect to the security feature was even stronger.
That still leaves an open question. Why did we fail to observe an increase in the valuation of the storage feature when it was the feature-at-issue
as compared to when it was not the feature-at-issue? Given that the storage
feature’s ranking decreased, this result is particularly puzzling. We hypothesize that mock jurors may have much more experience with the price of
smartphone storage and are thus less subject to cognitive bias when placing
a dollar value on that feature. Further research would have to be done to
prove or disprove this theory.
These results suggest that the same cognitive biases may be at play in
multicomponent patent cases. In short, jurors are likely awarding disproportionately high awards in multicomponent patent cases because of cognitive
biases. To ameliorate those effects, courts should focus on particular kinds
of rules directed at these biases. Our jury verdict manipulations attempted to
94
test one potential reform, but there are clearly other possibilities.

B. Jury Verdicts and Framing
Although our results showed that asking jurors to value many features
together decreases the value they assess for the feature-in-suit, we were sur-

94.
For example, one defendant unsuccessfully argued that juries should be explicitly
told about problems with patent hold-up and royalty stacking. See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link
Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“D–Link requested that the district court
instruct the jury regarding the dangers of patent hold-up and royalty stacking in RANDrelated contexts.”).
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prised to see how modest that decrease was: less than 10% of the baseline
damages award. Still, for cases that involve many millions of dollars, 10%
is still a large amount. The upshot is that for those that think that patent
damages in multicomponent cases are too high, giving the jury this novel
jury verdict form that lists the feature-at-issue alongside other features of
the multicomponent device is likely to lower damages. Moreover, there are
reasons to think that a standard verdict form wrongly focuses all the jury’s
attention on one feature. This creates a saliency bias and leaves the juror
without meaningful reference points to help frame their analysis. In contrast,
if a jury were required to value different features simultaneously, two benefits would likely emerge. It would reduce (but not eliminate) any saliency
bias, and it would also force the jury to create its own reference points (i.e.
the value of other features) to aid it in calculating the final damage awards.
But even if courts were sympathetic to these arguments, there remain a
number of practical questions. How should attorneys and the courts determine what other features can be fairly added to the jury verdict form? How
95
many other features can the jury really value?

C. Exposing the Anchor
When defendants specifically told mock jurors that plaintiffs were not
serious about their high demand ($99 in our experiment) and that the plaintiffs were simply trying to take advantage of anchoring, damages verdicts
were not significantly reduced. Thus, our findings were not consistent with
96
Stein & Drouin’s. More work will have to be done to see if Stein and
Drouin’s tactic can be replicated. It may well be that exposing the anchor to
the decision maker works in some contexts but not others. For now, we still
have not identified a particularly effective response to a plaintiff that an97
chors the jury in an irrationally high number.

95.
Expert witnesses are now using a survey technique called conjoint analysis to value
a specific feature. This involves asking survey respondents to value products with different
combinations of features and then calculate what the individual features are worth. See J.
Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog, Using Conjoint Analysis To Apportion Patent Damages, 25
FED. CIR. B.J. 581 (2016), for a description of the use of conjoint analysis in calculating patent damages. However, researchers have pointed out that using this technique on products
with large numbers of features may have “strained the methodology” by overloading respondents with too much information. See Green & Srinivasan, supra note 50, at 8. Similarly, jurors
may suffer from cognitive overload when they have to value one feature in a complex multicomponent product. This may place some limit on the number of features that the law can
meaningfully ask juries to value.
96.
Of course they tested this particular debiasing strategy in a different context, criminal sentencing. See Stein & Drouin, supra note 55, at 31.
97.
See supra notes 56 and 58 and accompanying text (describing the results of a prior
study assessing how different responses to anchoring works).

36

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 26:1

D. Punitive Damages
As many of the comments suggest, some mock jurors did not assess
damages by simply comparing the value of the product as delivered to the
value of the product as promised. Instead, these mock jurors imposed damages to either punish the defendant for its previous conduct or deter the defendant (or others) from doing something similar in the future. This was true
despite clear jury instructions and even though the defendant’s conduct did
not exhibit the kind of willful disregard of the rights of others that is typical98
ly required to award punitive damages.
There is a patent analog to this narrative because the same psychological effects at play in the experimental product misrepresentation case we
created are also likely at play in patent cases. In patent cases, juries may not
99
be strictly following the Georgia Pacific factors for calculating a reasona100
101
ble royalty or the Panduit factors for calculating lost profits. Instead it is
quite possible that they are also punishing defendants for infringing a patent.
This may be true even when enhanced damages are not uncalled for. In patent law, 35 U.S.C. § 284 permits courts to award treble damages for “egre102
gious cases of culpable behavior” like intentionally infringing a patent.
The Supreme Court has called this a “punitive sanction,” presumably to de103
ter others from doing the same. Notably, the jury determines whether the
case qualifies for enhanced damages, but the court must determine whether
104
to actually enhance the damages. In other words, patent juries do not determine the size of any punitive damages.
To be clear, we are not suggesting that this experiment proves that juries in patent cases are awarding punitive damages. It does not. This experiment only shows that some number of mock jurors appear to punish the defendant in this misrepresentation case. However, it does not take a large leap
in logic to hypothesize that something similar might be occurring when juries calculate patent damages. Indeed, as discussed earlier, our results are

98.
See, e.g., Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 76 (Cal. 2005) (“At a
minimum, California law requires conduct done with ‘willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others’ or despicable conduct done ‘in conscious disregard’ of a person’s
rights.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (quoting
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (suggesting punitive damages are
appropriate when defendant’s conduct is sufficiently “reprehensible”)).
99.
See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified sub nom. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d
295 (2d Cir. 1971).
100.
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
The Panduit factors are typically used in jury instructions on lost profits. See, e.g., Federal
Circuit Bar Association Model Jury Instruction 6.2 (2016).
101.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
102.
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016).
103.
Id. at 1936.
104.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
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entirely consistent with other studies that found that juries tend to award
higher damages when the underlying wrongful conduct is more blamewor105
thy. Further work will need to be done to establish if, when, and to what
extent, the same phenomenon is occurring for patent damages. What percentage of jurors punish and how much is that punishment? If the frequency
is small or the degree of punishment is not large, this may simply be noise
that is characteristic to any legal system.
However, if this is significant, several issues arise. It would suggest that
juries may be usurping the judge’s role under § 284. This would mean that
patent damages ordinarily couched in terms of compensation are being in106
flated for the purpose of deterring future infringers. If the type of infringement does not reflect egregious cases of culpable behavior, that would
suggest overcompensation. However, even if it does, that may mean patentees are receiving a double recovery, one award of punitive damages from
the jury and another from the judges. Courts could respond by seeking ways
to reduce the punitive portion of these awards with better jury instructions
or by bifurcating the case so that juries are blinded to the defendant’s
107
blameworthy conduct.
But there is another side to this argument. It could be that legal standards that require higher levels of blameworthy conduct before calling for
108
punitive damages are overly protective of defendants. They are not consistent with the public’s perception of when punishment is deserved. Perhaps juries should not follow the letter of law in these cases. Our point is not
to answer these larger jury nullification questions, but to simply provide
empirical evidence of how juries will react when they are told to award
compensatory damages.

Conclusion
Our study suggests that some combination of saliency bias and anchoring cause juries to award higher damages for two tested features (camera
resolution and enhanced security), but not a third (amount of storage). For
the third feature, these heuristics affected how jurors ranked the value of the
feature, but this effect did not appear to lead to an equivalent change in the
105.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
106.
Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 335-40 (2006) (providing a
detailed discussion of how different types of damages in patent law either serve to compensate
patentees or punish or deter infringers).
107.
See BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE,
FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (Christopher Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016)
(providing many examples of how blinding decision makers to bias can improve decisions in
various contexts).
108.
See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT ch. 11
(2007) (exploring the topic of jury nullification in depth).
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monetary valuation. Modifying the jury verdict form to require mock jurors
to assess the value of many features simultaneously reduced damages modestly while the defendant’s tactic of exposing the anchor did not. In addition, qualitative comments suggested that some mock jurors resisted the jury
instructions designed to compensate plaintiffs for the missing feature and
instead assessed damages to punish the defendant.
These results are nuanced and cause us to ask as many questions as we
answer. Why is saliency and anchoring so powerful with two features, but
less effective in another? What other factors are interacting with our findings to enhance or reduce them in particular contexts? Can our findings be
replicated with a patent case, particularly with respect to the mock jurors’
desire to use damages to punish? We cannot answer these questions now,
but hope that this article causes both policymakers and commentators to
start thinking more seriously about how the psychology of jury decisionmaking might affect patent damages. It is clearly not enough to lay down a
set of well thought out rules if juries will not follow them, albeit unintentionally. To the extent that patent damages in multicomponent cases are irrationally large, much work remains to be done to determine why some juries
disagree, much less nudge their decisions downward. Our study shows that
revising the jury verdict form only provides limited benefits in this direction.

Saliency, Anchors & Frames

Fall 2019]

39

Appendix A
Table A1 illustrates the “All Model” where the base case is set at
“Camera” when the camera is the feature-at-issue. For example, the average
storage damages value was $7.10 less than the average awarded camera
damages value.

Table A1 – All Model
Variable

Basic
Model

Feature-At65.89***
Issue (Intercept
set at Camera
Value)
Storage Feature -$7.10*
-$22.50***
Security
Feature
Verdict (rank 5)
Verdict (rank 8)
Debias (ON)
Gender (male)
Age
Education
(leveled at
“some high
school
education”)
Income (leveled
at “less than
$10,000”)
Politics (Slight
Republican)
Politics
(Repubs)
Politics (Strong
Repubs)

Basic +
Verdict

Basic +
Debias

69.34*** 66.90***

Basic +
Political
(“Strong
Dems”)
73.02***

-5.04
-5.44

All Model

63.70***

-4.78
-4.72
-1.56
+0.06
+0.16
-0.79

-2.09

+4.21
-16.06*** -10.73*
-15.47*** -9.96*
-12.85*

-5.79

Basic + Framing (isolate Framing effect)
Table A2 shows how different jury verdicts affected damages. The base
case is the standard jury verdict form, where each respondent valued the
feature-at-issue separately, rather than simultaneously with either 5 or 8
other features. Table A2 also contains 95% confidence intervals.
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Table A2 – Basic + Framing
Average Std. Error
Damages
Award
$69.34
2.87

Normal (Intercept)
Together5
-$5.04 from
intercept
Together8
-$5.44 from
intercept
Together5+8
-$5.23

t value

p-value

Confidence
Intervals

24.20

1.50e-101

3.05

-1.65

0.09

3.15

-1.73

0.08

2.65

-1.97

0.049*

$63.72 to
$74.96
-$11.03 to
$0.96
-$11.63 to
$0.74
-$10.44 to
-$0.02

Basic + Debiasing (isolate Debiasing effect)
Table A3 shows the effect on damage values when the defendant accused
the plaintiffs of anchoring. The base case is the “no counter” argument,
where the plaintiff does not expose the defendant’s psychological “anchoring” techniques during the trial. Table A3 also contains 95% confidence intervals.

Table A3 – Basic + Exposing the Anchor

No Counter
(Intercept)
Counter ON

Average
Damages
Award
$66.90

Std. Error

t value

P-value

Confidence
Intervals

2.59

25.87

1.38e-112

-$2.09 from 2.56
intercept

- 0.82

0.41

$61.82 to
$71.98
-$7.10 to
$2.93

Political Regression 
Table A4 illustrates how damages values are affected based on political
leanings. The base case is set to the average damages value for respondents
who strongly preferred Democrats and where the feature at issue was the
security feature.

Table A4 – Politics

(Intercept)

Average Damages Std. Error
Award
$50.75
3.03

t value

p-value

16.77

< .001 ***
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FAIcam

$22.27

3.07

7.27

< .001 ***

FAIsto

$15.31

3.11

4.93

< .001 ***

Dems
Slight Dems
No Preference
Slight Repubs
Repubs
Strong Repubs

-$8.86
-$4.47
-$6.78
-$16.07
-$15.47
-$12.85

4.11
4.46
3.98
4.80
4.62
5.28

2.15
-1.00
-1.74
-3.35
-3.35
-2.43

.031*
.32
.083
< .001 ***
< .001 ***
.015*

